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'. 
[So F. No. 21372. In Bank. Aug. 25, 1964.] 
A~lDOORAND MATERIALS COMPANY, Plaintift, Cross-
defendant and Respondent, v. FRESNO GUARANTEE 
SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, Defendant, Cross-
complainant and Appellant; M. KELLNER & SON 
LUMBER COMPANY et a!., Cross-defendants and Re-
spondents; BENJAMIN LEVITT et at, Cross-defendants 
and Appellants. 
[la,lb] Liens-Equitable Lieu.-In a declaratory relief action to 
determine the rights of unpaid materialmen to the proceeds of 
eonstrnction loans held by defendant, there was no support 
for a determination that mechanic's lien claimants were en-
titled to equitable liens on the loan funds where there was no 
evidence of any reliance on the loan funds or any inaucement 
so to rely, and no evidence from which reliance could reason-
ably be inferred. 
[2] ld.-Equitable Lieu.-An equitable lien may be imposed on 
a constrnction-loan fund only if it is established that the 
borrower or lender induced the supplier of labor or materials 
to rely on the fund for payment. 
[3] Mecbanics'Liens-Stop Notice-E1rect of Failure to File 
Mechanic's Lien.-That stop-notice claimants of the proceeds 
of constrnction loans failed to file mechanic's lien claims did 
not foreclose them from the right to recover on their stop-
notice claims, since. such a claim does not depend on estab-
lishment of a lien. The remedies are independent and cumu-
lative. 
[1] See Oal.Jur.2d, Liens, §§ 10,11; Am.Jur., Liens (1st ed § 18). 
I3] See Oa1.Jur.2d, Mechanic's Liens, § 54. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Liens, § 8; [3] Mechanics' Liens, 
fi77; [4) Mechanics' Liens, §82(1); [5) Mechanics' Liens, f81; 
[6, 7] Mechanics' Liens, § 233; [8] Mechanics' Liens, § 75. 
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(4] Id.-Stop lfotice-Efl'ect of lfotice-As Equitable (lanlish-
ment.-Although Code Civ. Proe., § 1190.1, subd. (h), relating 
to stop-notice procedure by a mechanic or materialman, refers 
to stop-notice claims as effecting an equitable garnishment, the 
use of such term does not imply that stop-notice claimants' 
right to recover depended on the owners' rights under a loan 
agreement with the construction-loan fundholder; tbe fund-
holder's obligation under the statute to withhold claimed funds 
applies not only when his contract cans for payment but even 
when it does not, and, in addition, subd. (h) provides that no 
assignment by thil· owner of construction . loan funds, whether 
made before or after a verified claim is filed, shall be held to 
take priority over claims filed under such subdivision, and such 
assignment shan have no binding force insofar as the rights 
of claimants who file claims thereunder are concerned. 
[6] Id.-Stop lfotice-Efl'ect of Prior Assignment.-A construc-
tion of Code Civ.Proc.,§ 1190.1, subd. (h), relating to stop-
notice procedure by a mechanic or materialman, that invali-
dates an owner's assignment of a construction fund hack to 
the lender with a progress payment agreement is not an uncon-
stitutional infringement of the fundholder's right to contract; 
it is a legitimate legislative purpose to give suppliers of 
materials and labor reasonable assurance that thilY will be 
compensated, and subordinating the claims of assignees of 
construction-loan funds to those of stop-notice claimants is a 
reasonable way to accomplish that purpose. 
[6] Id.-Judgment-Interest.-Wbere a construction-loan fund-
holder withheld· funds until stop-notice claimants had estab-
lished their claims, not in breach of its obligations, but in 
compliance wit)! the requirements of both Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 1190.1, subd. (h), relating to stop-notice procedure by a 
mechanic or materialman, and Code Civ. Proe., § 1197.1, relat-
ing to the time for commencing an action to enforce payment 
of any stop-notice claim, such fundholder was not personally 
liable for interest before judgment and its liability for stop-
notice claims was limited to the amount of the fund against 
which the claims were asserted. ""'" 
I 
I 
[7] Id.-Judgment-Interest.-Although a construction-loan fund-
holder was not personally liable for prejudgment interest on 
stop-notice claims, it was liable to the extent that construction- '1.,,- , 
loan fbnds were available for whatever the owners owed the 
stop-notice claimants, including prejudgnlent interest properly 
chargeable to the ownell. 
[8] Id.-Stop lfotice-Computation of Amount Withheld. - An 
award of prejudgment interest to stop-notice claimants which 
is properly chargeable agninst the owners does not create an 
unreasonable uncertainty for construction-loan fundholders as 
) 
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to how much of the loan funds must be withheld when bonded 
stop notices are filed, since, by examining the bond accom-
panying the notice, which must be in the amount of one and 
one quarter times the amount of the claim, the fundholder can 
determine that it must withhold 80 per cent of the amount 
of the bond. 
APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of 
Fresno County. Edward L. Kellas, Judge. Affirmed in part 
and reversed in part with directions. 
Action against maker of a construction loan to recover 
amount claimed from loan fund by a bonded stop notice; and 
cross-action by defendant for a declaration of rights of all 
unpaid materialmen. Judgment declaring that stop-notice 
claimants had prior equitable liens on the loan fund and that 
mechanic's lien claimants and lender had subordinate equitable 
liens and holding defendant personally liable for interest be-
fore judgment, reversed as to mechanic's lien claimants, re-
versed with directions as to personal liability of defendant 
lender for interest before jUdgment, and in all other respects 
affirmed. 
Docker, Docker, Perkins & Shelton, John M. Shelton and 
Frederick W. Docker for Defendant, Cross-complainant and 
Appellant. 
McKenna & Fitting, Norman H. Raiden, James C. Peterson, 
Morrison, Foerster, Holloway, Clinton & Clark, Douglas C. 
White, Landels, Ripley, Gregory & Diamond and Edward D. 
Landels as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant, Cross-com-
plainant and Appellant. 
Doty, Quinlan & Kershaw, Burke & La Rue and William A. 
Quinlan for Cross-defendants and Appellants. 
Clifford R. Lewis for Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and Re-
spondent. 
• 
Hynes, Bowser & Brunn and McKnight Brunn as Amici 
Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and Respondent. 
Meux, Gallagher, Baker & Manock, Kendall L. Manock and 
Ralph Moradian for Cross-defendants and Respondents . 
. 
) 
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TRAYNOR, J.-Defendant and certain cross-<'lefendants 
appeal from a judgment for plaintiff and cross-defendants 
determining the rights of unpaid matE'rialmen to the pro-
ceeds of construction loans held by defendant savings and loan 
association. 
The case was tried on an agreed statement of facts. De-
fendant entered into three construction-loan agreements with 
the owners of three parcels of unimproved real property. Each 
loan was secured by a deed of trust on the parcel of property 
to which the loan was to be applied. The owners assigned the 
loan funds to defendant, and defendant agreed to disburse 
them in five equal progress payments, the last payment to 
be due on the completion of each project. Construction of 
the buildings was not completed, and no further work was 
done after the fourth progress payment. Defendant retained 
the unexpended funds. Plaintiff and three other unpaid 
materialmen (hereinafter called stop-notice claimants) filed 
bonded stop notices with defendant pursuant to section 1190.1, 
subsection (h) of the Code of Civil Procedure.! Several other 
materialmen (hereinafter called mechanic's lien claimants), 
who did not file stop notices, filed mechanic's lien claims. 
Plaintiff brought this action to enforce its claim, and defend-
ant cross-complained for a declaration of the rights of all 
parties interested in the disposition of the loan funds. All 
of the cross-defendants who answered claimed a right to the 
loan funds, the stop-notice claimants on the basis of their 
notices and the mechanic's lien claimants on the ground that 
having recorded mecl1anic's liens, they had equitable liens on 
lSection 1190.1, subsection (h) provides that any supplier of labor or 
materials except the general contractor "in any instance in which the 
funds with which the cost of the work of improvements are, wholly or in 
part, to be defrayed from the proceeds of a building loan, [may] give 
to ••• [any] party holding any funds furnished or to be furnished by the 
owner or lender or any other person as a fund from which to pay con-
struction costs or arising out of a construction or building loan, a notice" 
that he has supplied labor materials of a specified value to the owner. 
If a bond of a specified amount is filed with the notil'e of claim, the 
person given the notiee "must withhold from the borrower or other 
person to whom· said owner may be obligated to make payments or 
advancements out of said fund sufficient money to answer such claim ..•• 
No assignment by the owner ••• of construction loan funds, whether 
made before [or after] a verified claim is filed . . • shall be held to take 
priority over claims filed under this subsection (h) and such assignment 
shall have no binding force insofar as the rights of claimants who file 
claims hereunder are concerned.' , 
) 
732 .A.-I DOOR & :MATERIALS CO. t). FBEBNo[61 C.2d 
GUAB. SAY. & LoAN ASSN. 
the funds. Defendant admitted that the claimants had not 
been paid and stipulated to tIle amounts of their claims, but 
contended that it had a right to apply the undisbursed funds 
to reduce the owners' debt to it or to complete the buildings. 
The trial court held that the stop-notice claimants were 
entitled to recover from defendant on their claims; that those 
claims were of equal priority and bad priority over all other 
claims; and that the mechanic's lien claimants had· equitable 
liens on the loan funds of equal priority with the defendant's 
claim that it had a right to use the funds to complete the 
buildings. The trial court allowed interest on all claims 
and held it to be a personal liability of defendant. 
[1a] We agree with defendant that the evidence does not 
support the finding that the mechanic's lien claimants were 
entitled to equitable liens on the loan funds. [2] An equi-
table lien may be imposed on a construction-loan fund only if 
it is established that the borrower or lender induced the 
supplier of labor or materials to rely on the fund for payment. 
(Smith v. Anglo-California Trust Co., 205 Cal. 496, 501-504 
[271 P. 898] ; Pacific Bead'll 'Cut Homes, Inc. v. Title Ins. ct 
Trust Co., 216 Cal. 447,450-452 [14 P.2d 510].) [1b] There 
is no evidence in the record of any reliance on the loan funds 
or of any inducement so to rely. Nor is there any evidence 
from which reliance may reasonably be inferred. (Compare 
Smith v. Anglo-California Trust Co., supra, at pp. 502-503.) 
Invoking Hayward Lbr. ct In11. Co. v. Coast etc. Assn., 47 
Cal.App.2d 211 [117 P.2d 682], the mechanic's lien claim-
ants contend that they established their right to an equitable 
lien merely by filing mechanic's lien claims. That case did 
not so decide. The fundholder there conceded the claimants' 
right to the fund, and the only issue litigated was whether it 
was necessary to file suit to perfect the claims. 
[3] The mechanic's lien claimants contend that the tria] 
court erred in upholding the claims of two stop-notice claim-
ants because they did not file mechanic's lien claims. The 
right to recover on a stop-notice claim, however, "does not 
depend ltpon the establishment of a lien." (Diamond Match 
Co. v. S'iZberstein, 165 Cal. 282, 288 [131 P. 874].) The 
remedies are independenti and cumulative. CIa. at pp. 288-
289; CaZhoun v. Huntington Park First Sa11. ct Loan Assn., 
186 Cal.App.2d 451,459 [9 Cal.Rptr. 479], and cases cited.) 
[4] Defendant contends that the stop-notice claims should 
not baye been allowed because section 1190.1, subsection (b) 
) 
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provides for an equitable garnishment of construction.loan 
funds. An effective legal garnishment depends on there being 
an existing debt owed by the garnishee to the debtor. De. 
fendant owes the owners nothing, however, because of their 
default. In defendant's view there is therefore nothing to 
garnish. 
Section 1190.1, subsection (h) does refer to the stop·notice 
claims as effecting an equitable garnishment. As defendant 
points out, this term undoubtedly was derived from a series 
of cases interpreting the stop·notice provisions of the me· 
chanic's lien law enacted in 1885 (Stats. 1885, Cll. 152, p. 
143) and amended or repealed in 1911 (Stats. 1911, ch. 681, 
p. 1313.) The term "equitable garnishment" was used inter· 
changeably with "equitable assignment," .. equitable lien," 
and "equitable subrogation" (see, e.g., Bates v. Oounty of 
Santa Barbara, 90 Cal. 543, 546-547 [27 P. 438]; Weldon y. 
Superior Oourt, 138 Cal. 427, 429-430 [71 P. 502] ; Butler v. 
NO Ohung, 160 Cal. 435, 439 [117 P. 512, Ann.Cas. 1913A 
940] ; Diamond Match 00. v. Silberstein, 165 Cal. 282, 288 
[131 P. 874] ; Stettin v. Wilson, 175 Cal. 423,426 [166 P. 6]) 
to describe the effect of stop-notice claims on funds held by 
owners. Under the statutory provisions in effect at that time 
the personal liability of the owner to stop-notice claimants was 
limited, as it presently is under section 1190.1, subsection 
(c), to the amount "due or that may become due" to the 
owner's contractor. It was suggested in dicta in several of 
the foregoing cases that the claimants' rights against tIle owner 
were tIlerefore limited to the contractor's rights under his 
contract. This position would be consistent with the use of the 
terms "garnishment," "assignment," or "subrogation" in 
their usual senses. Nevertheless, in the most recent case de-
cided by this court in which the issue was considered, Stettin 
v. Wilson, 175 Cal 423, 426 [166 P. 6], it was held that the 
terms of the owner's contract with his contractor, which would 
have barred any recovery by the contractor because he had 
abandoned his contract, did not preclude recovery from the 
owner by st.()p-notice claimants. That there was no money due 
under the contract was held not to be determinative of the 
issue. (See also O. OmwT!l; Lbr. 00. v. Weinsve1'g, 168 Cal. 
664,668.670 [143 P. 10.25] ; Diamond :Mafch 00. v. St'lberstein, 
165 Cal. 282, 286-288 [131 P. 874] ; Hampton v. Christensen, 
·148 Cal. 729, 737-739 [84 P. 200].) Thus the use of the 
term" equitablc gnrnisllme>nt" does not imply that the stop. 
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notice claimants' right to recover depends on the owners' 
rights under their contract with defendant. Nor does the use 
of the word "withhold" in subsection (h) imply that tIle 
monies withheld must be due the owner. The fact that the 
fundholder may be under no compUlsion to pay does not 
mean that he ~ay not voluntarily disburse the funds. The 
requirement that the fundholder withhold claimed funds ap-
plies not only when his contract calls for payment but even 
when it does not. 
Subsection (h) requires that upon receipt of a bonded stop-
notice claim the fundholder ., must withhold from the bor-
rower or other person to whom said owner may be obligated 
to make payments or advancements out of said fund sufficient 
money to answer such claim." The subsection does not re-
quire the fund110lder to withhold only so much of the fund as 
may be due under its contract with thc owner. On the con-
trary the "said fund'" from which a lcnder must withhold 
claimed money is defined in the first paragraph of subsection 
(h) as that amount "furnislled or to be furnished by the ... 
lender ... as a fund from which to pay construction costs," 
or that amount "arising out of a construction or building 
loan." The fundholder must therefore withhold from funds 
furnished to pay construction costs or arising out of a con-
struction loan sufficient money to answer bonded stop-notice 
claims regardless of the terms of its contract with the owner. 
If the terms of that contract determined the rights of the 
claimants under subsection (h), the parties to the contract 
could effectively eliminate those rigllts. They might, for ex-
ample, condition the lender's obligation to pay on there being 
no stop notices filed. Subsection (h) requires that funds 
V earmarked for construction purposes be used· to pay suppliers 
of labor and materials who file claims under the subsection 
and therefore supersedes the private arrangements of bor-
rower and lender. 
Furthermore, defendant's claim to tIle funds in this case 
is incompatible with the final sentence of subsection (h): 
"No assignment by the owner ... of construction loan funds, 
whether made before [or after] a verified claim is filed ..• 
shall be held to take priority over claims filed under this 
subsectton (11) and such assignment sllaH have no binding 
force insofar as the rights of claimants W]lO fi](' claims here-
under are concerned." The arrangem('nt brtween tIle oWIl('rs 
and,def(,lIdant is directly controlled by this provision. De-
) 
) 
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fendant lent specified amounts to the owners for construc-
tion purposes, and the owners executed promissory notes for, 
and agreed to pay interest on, the full amount of each loan. 
Such a fund as is contemplated by subsection (h) was there-
fore created. The owners assigned the funds to defendant as 
security for their obligation to repay the loans and for any 
of their other obligations to defendant.1 Defendant agreed 
to disburse the funds according to a progress payment sched-
ule. Thus defendant's possession of the funds and its de-
fense to the stop-notice claims based on its asserted right to 
continued possession of the funds depend entirely on assign-
ments invalidated by the terms of subsection (h). 
Defendant contends that allowing the claims herein will 
result in forcing it to violate state statutes governing the lend-
ing practices of savings and loan associations. These statutes 
limit the amount of construction loans to a specified percent-
age of the projected appraised value of the property to be 
improved. (Fin. Code, §§ 7152-7154, 7156.) There is no 
showing in this case, howenr, that the loans exceeded the 
permitted percentage. It is therefore unnecessary to consider 
the issue. 
[6] There is no merit in defendant's contention that a 
construction of section 1190.1, subsection (h) that invalidates 
the assignment is an unconstitutional infringement of its right 
to contract. It is a legitimate legislative purpose to give sup-
pliers of materials and labor reasonable assurance that they 
will be compensated. (Cal. Const., art. XX, § 15; Boystone 
CO. V. Darling, 171 Cal. 526, 540 [154 P. 15]), and subordi-
nating the claims of assignees of construction-loan funds to 
those of stop-notice claimants is a reasonable way to accom-
plish that purpose. Furthermore a lender such as defendant 
can make loan funds immune from claims under section 
1190.1, subsection (h) by furnishing a materials and labor 
bond complying with the requirements of section 1185.1.of the 
Code of Civil Procedure. (Code Civ.Proc., § 1190.1, sub-
sec. (j).) 
[6] Defendant correctly contends that the trial court 
erred in hQlding it personally liable for interest before judg-
ment. Stop-notice claims to one of the three funds, the fund 
allocated to Parcell, exceeded the amount in that fund. The 
1 
IDefendant alao was civen tint deeds of trust on the property to be 
improved as 8ecuritJr for the loanB. 
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trial court prorated the claims 80 that their total equaled 
the amount of that fund and allowed interest before judgment 
on the claims as adjusted. Defendant was thus held liable 
for an amount in excess of that fund. The stop-notice claim-
ants concede that defendant complied with the provisions of 
section 1190.1, subsection (h) by withholding the funds from 
the owners, but contend that section 1190.1, subsection (h) 
impliedly requires the fundholder to pay tIle claims, pro rata 
if necessary, as soon as their total has been ascertained. 
A failure to pay at tllat time, they contend, is a breach of 
the fundholder's obligation resUlting in its being personally 
liable for interest on the claims from the date the fund-
holder's obligation to pay arose. 
The claimants' right to payment, however,arises not simply 
upon their giving notice of their claims, but upon compliance 
with section 1197.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Subsec-
tion (a) of that section provides, "No action to enforce 
the payment of any claim, notice of which may be given 
pursuant to article 2 [Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1190.1-1192.2], 
shall be commenced against the ownerl8] • . .prior to the 
expiration of the period within which claims of lien must 
be filed for record, as prescribed by section 1193.1 of this 
code, nor shall any such suit be commenced later than 90 
days following the expiration of such period. No money . . . 
shall be withheld by reason of any such notice as is prescribed 
by article 2 longer than said 90 days . . • unless proceedings 
be commenced in a proper court within that time by the 
claimant to enforce his claim; and . . . upon the termina-
tion of said 90 days above provided if such proceedings have 
not been commenced, such notice shall cease to be effective 
and the moneys . . . withheld shall be paid or delivered to 
the . . . person to whom they are due." Subsections (c) 
and (d) provide for the joinder of parties, for the consolida-
tion of actions, and for impleading all claimants to withheld 
funds "to the end that the respective rights of all parties 
may be adjudicated and settled" in one action. Defendant's 
withholding the funds until the claimants established their 
'Because of his interest in the loan funds, the owner i8 a neeeesary 
party to a proceeding to enforce a claim, notice of which is given under 
8ection 1190.1, subsection (h)(sce Gregg v. Stark, 128 Cal.App. 434, 
436-437 [17 P.2d 766]; Neal v. Bqn'k of America, 93 Cal.App.2d 678, 
681 [209 P.2d 825]), and is a necessary party to a complete settlement 
of the entire controversy. (See Bank of CalifOf'1l,ia v. Superior Court, 16 
Cal.2d 516, 523 [106 P.2d 879].) 
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claims was therefore not in breach of its obligations but in 
compliance with the requirements of both section 1190.1, 
subsection (h) and section 1197.1. Defendant's liability for 
stop-notice claims is therefore limited to the amount of the 
fund against which the claims are asserted. 
[7] There is no merit, however, in defendant's conten-
tion that if a fundholder complies with section 1190.1, sub-
section (h) no interest before judgment can ever be allowed. 
Defendant concedes that interest before judgment would 
properly be chargeable to the owners in this case. .As stated 
in Oalhoun v. Huntington Park First Sav. & Loan Assn., 
186 Cal.App.2d 451, 462 [9 Cal.Rptr. 479], "The 'equitable 
garnishment' effected through stop notice proceedings, like 
the mechanic's lien, 'is as extensive as the claim which it is 
intended to protect.' (Pacific Mutual Life Ins. 00. v. Fisher, 
106 Cal. 224, 233, 234 [39 P. 758].)" (See Diamond Match 
Co. v. Silberstein, 165 Cal. 282, 288-289 [131 P. 874].) To 
the extent that construction-loan funds are available, there-
fore, the fundllOlder must pay whatever the owners owe the 
stop-notice claimants. 
[8] Nor is there any merit in defendant's contention that 
awarding interest before judgment will create unreasonable 
uncertainty for fundholders as to how much of the loan funds 
must be withheld when bonded stop notices are filed. The 
fundholder must withhold the amount claimed in the stop 
notice, and any doubts about how much to withhold can be 
resolved by examining the bond accompanying the notice. 
To compel the withholding of funds the claimant must file 
It bond in the amount of one and one quarter times the amount 
of the claim. The amount that must be withheld is there-
fore eighty per cent of the amount of the bond. 
The trial court's decision does not, as defendant contends, 
create uncertainty about the date from which to compute 
interest. The court awarded interest to two of the claimants 
from the date the owners' obligation became due, which was 
correct (Civ. Code, § 3287), and to the other claimants from 
the date that their notices were filed. Since the latter claim-
ants asked for interest from the date the notices were filed 
and did not allege or prove that the obligations were due at 
an earlier date, the cou~ 's award to them was also correct. 
The judgment for the mechanic's lien claimants is reversed. 
To the extent that defendant was held personally liable for 
interest before judgment, the judgment is reversed with direc-
11 c.a.s--.I 
/.\ / ) 
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tions to the trial court to recompute thc claims to the fund 
allocated to Parcel 1 .80 that the total of the prorated claims 
including interest equals the amount of that fund. In all 
other respects the judgment is affirmed. Defendant and the 
stop-notice claimants shall recover their costs on the appeal 
of the mechanic's lien claimants. Defendant shall recover 
its costs on its appeal from the judgment in favor of the 
mechanic's lien claimants. The stop-notice claimants and 
defendant shall bear their own costs on defendant's appeal 
from the judgment in favor of the stop-notice claimants. 
Gibson, O. J., Schauer, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, 
J., and Peek, J., concurred. 
r"" ~ .. -. -- ---
, 
